by Paul Doherty and Michael A. Poole
Published by the University of Ulster, Coleraine 1995
ISBN 1 85923 023 7
Paperback 116pp £6.00
Out of Print

CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Empirical

The opening chapters of this volume have traced the troubled history of Northern Ireland's major city, focusing on the relationship between residential segregation and violence, in the form of rioting,
intimidation and public disorder. Several clear empirical points emerge, some of which have previously been noted elsewhere but which are nonetheless worth repeating here. Firstly, this is a system of considerable stability (Boal, 1981b). Residential segregation in Belfast is not a new phenomenon,
but, as has been shown, it has been in existence since the birth of the city. This stability derives from
inertia in the system: once segregated areas develop, they tend to be perpetuated by what may be
termed normal residential mobility processes within the housing market.

Secondly, segregation is a spatial outcome of violence. It has been a recurring theme in the
literature which we have reviewed that violence occurs on sectarian interfaces, leads to a
sharpening of those interfaces, and produces sorting of the population, as isolated households
move to the safety of segregated areas within their own ethnic community. "In an endemic conflict
situation such as that which exists in Belfast, residential segregation becomes a critical mechanism for group survival." (Boal et al., 1976, p122.)

Thirdly, the overall trend in segregation as revealed by the various indices presented to the present
day is upward. It has been suggested (Boal et al., 1976, p98) that the relationship between conflict and segregation follows a cyclical pattern: periodic outbursts of violence result in a rapid response in the segregation system. Subsequent decline in overt conflict is followed after a time lag, by a gradual diminution in residential segregation. This model implies an oscillating level of segregation, around
some 'average' value, and that increases in segregation are subsequently matched by compensating downswings.

However, while it is true that conflict is followed by increased segregation, there is no real evidence in the Belfast experience to suggest that after the violent episode ends the segregation returns to its previous level. The years 1935 to 1968 were identified as a period without major confrontation, but during this period segregation levels remained high, and between 1937 and 1961 the D value declined by only 1.5 percentage points at ward level. Table 5.1 shows a D value of 44.9 for the 15 wards for census night in April 1971, before the massive population movements of that summer, but the segregation levels still had not fallen back to what they had been in 1911. This leads to the conclusion that while segregation falls when there is no conflict, it does not fall back to where it had been before the preceding outbreak of violence, and therefore the overall trend is inexorably upward. Rather than witnessing an oscillating
level of segregation, we in fact see a ratchet effect in operation (Smith and Chambers, 1991, p112), by which segregation rises in a stepwise fashion, only falling back slightly after an extended period of tranquillity.

Fourthly, speaking at a symposium in 1980, Boal suggested that the period from 1969 was significantly different in two ways: open ethnic conflict had continued for longer than ever before, and previous outbursts were not contemporaneous with urban renewal and the widespread availability of public
sector housing (Boal, 1981b). Fifteen years later, the length of the conflict is if anything an even more significant factor. Segregation levels have been shown to be at an all-time high following a conflict of unprecedented length and intensity. Earlier this century a period of 25 to 30 conflict-free years elapsed before a slight decline in segregation levels could be observed, and it must be expected that a similarly lengthy period must go by before there is any significant desegregation.

Focusing now on the years 1971 to 1991, this period has been the most traumatic in Belfast's history,
both in terms of the direct impact of the Troubles on its citizens' lives, and in terms of the population movements that have been directly or indirectly influenced by them. The city has in addition been subject to the more normal processes of urban population change and redistribution. The overall outcome of
these forces has been a city that has seen an overall decline in population, particularly marked in the inner city, but with strong population growth in Newtownabbey and Lisburn where there has been substantial housing development.

This change in population numbers has been accompanied by a change in ethnic composition, with the Belfast Local Government District becoming more Catholic, while the suburban areas have become
more Protestant. However while there has been a marked increase in the proportion of Catholics in the LGD, they still predominate in only a comparatively limited area in the west of the city. Catholics are
more likely to be living in areas where they are in the minority, and are also more likely to be living in mixed areas. The eastern part of the Urban Area has strengthened its Protestant numerical dominance.

These changes in ethnic composition have led to an overall increase in residential segregation within the Urban Area. Most of this increase took place in the decade 1971-81 when the Troubles were at their most intense, and when large scale forced population movements occurred. However the experience of the different parts of the BUA has varied considerably, and no clear pattern of change is evident.
The highest level of segregation, with the exception of some peripheral new-build areas outside the
Stop Line, is in Belfast West. High levels are also found in the LGDs of Lisburn and Castlereagh.
Both Lisburn and Newtownabbey have experienced population growth and a strong increase in segregation, but while Lisburn has become more Catholic over the twenty years, Newtownabbey has become more Protestant. Belfast East and Castlereagh which were already Protestant areas have both become even more Protestant, and have also experienced increasing segregation.

The Belfast Inner area has undergone very substantial population decline and inner city redevelopment, becoming more Catholic in the process. The lowest levels of segregation are found in the more middle class areas of Belfast South and Holywood. In Belfast South the level of segregation has remained static even though the population balance has become more Catholic. Holywood, which is not strongly connected to the rest of the BUA and which has always been quite distinctive in its experience of residential segregation, has had a slight fall in its proportion of Catholics, while its D value has dropped to an even lower level.

Looking at the P* indices which provide a measure of the social isolation of the two communities over the twenty year period, two basic features are found in the BUA as a whole. Firstly, the P* values for Protestants are high and have changed little, and secondly the values for Catholics have changed in the direction of increased isolation.

Examination of the indices for the different areas confirms these observations, and provides a little more insight. The P* indices for Protestants are high in all areas, only falling below 0.70 in Belfast West. In the East and in Newtownabbey, which have become more Protestant over the time period, the pP*p values have risen slightly, indicating an even higher probability of Protestant meeting Protestant. In Castlereagh and Holywood, the pP*p values remain constant. In both these areas the proportion of Catholics has fallen very slightly. But in all other areas - Inner, North, West, South and Lisburn - the pP*p values have fallen, and all these areas have experienced an increase in the proportion of Catholics. We can conclude therefore that if the proportion of Protestants in an area rises, Protestants become even more isolated. If the proportion stays fairly constant, they remain at the same high level of isolation. If the proportion of Catholics in an area increases, the Protestant isolation levels fall, but remain high.

However for Catholics the experience has been different. With only two exceptions, the cP*c values have risen in all areas, including those areas which have become more Catholic. In some areas the rise has been substantial, in particular Lisburn (from 0.19 to 0.60) and Belfast North (from 0.35 to 0.56). The two areas which have not seen rises in cP*c are Belfast West and Holywood. In Belfast West, the already high value remained constant. In Holywood, there was a slight drop in cP*c, confirming Holywood's standing as an area of low segregation.

At the end of the twenty year inter-censal period, we can conclude that Protestants remain highly isolated from their Catholic counterparts, while Catholics, who started the period with lower P* values, have become more isolated, more likely to meet fellow Catholics and less likely to encounter Protestants.
We can also observe that the mechanism of segregation has remained unchanged to the present day: members of the minority in a district are intimidated from their homes, or leave because they feel insecure.

The Report by the Commission of Inquiry into Riots in Belfast in 1857, and the report by the
Community Relations Commission into the 1971 riots have already been quoted as providing
examples of that mechanism. We conclude this empirical summary with a contemporary illustration.
As this volume was in preparation, inquests were held into the deaths of two Catholics who were murdered on separate occasions in 1993 at their homes in different parts of predominantly Protestant
East Belfast. "Mr Leckey [the coroner] asked RUC Inspector Alan Clegg, who investigated both
killings, 'Is the aim to drive Roman Catholics out of these areas?'

Inspector Clegg replied: 'That is the bottom line from the paramilitary point of view.... Mr Leckey said: 'I cannot help but conclude that these attacks were to engender fear among other Roman Catholics living
in the same area with a view to making them leave the area. There does not appear to be any other
reason at all. In both cases these were mixed communities where relations were good and what
happened must have been very frightening for all of those living in the area." (Belfast Telegraph, 22nd June, 1994).

Methodological

Finally, we come to the methodological issues addressed. One which received no more than passing attention, because of the desire not to dwell too long on technical matters, was the problem of geographical scale-level. The subareas used in the analysis were wards and kilometre squares, and both are so large that it frequently had to be pointed out that apparently mixed subareas at these levels might well be internally segregated. Thus micro-level segregation could be masked by the coarseness of a
spatial mesh comprised of wards or kilometre squares.

This qualification certainly does not invalidate the macro-analysis of this volume, for the macro needs
to be measured just as much as does the micro - no more, no less (Poole and Boal, 1973, p7).
However, there is a need to supplement the work presented here with an analysis of smaller spatial subareas such as the enumeration districts for which data is now released in a Small Area Statistics package from Census Office. The companion volume to this one will, in fact, switch the focus to a more micro-level of segregation analysis to help achieve an overall balance.

The principal methodological problems which did receive more than simply passing attention in
this volume were those associated with the use of religion as an indicator of ethnicity. It was explained
that these are not problems which arise because substantial numbers of people do not state their
religion or indicate that they have no religion. We have examined the impact of this on the measurement
of segregation by experimenting with alternative ways of classifying these problematic groups. The basic objective of the experiments has been to identify whether the people involved are ethnically Protestant or Catholic.

Our conclusion has to be that it is inappropriate to apply a consistent methodology to deal with this problem in the same way in all three difficult census years. The use of such a strategy to analyse the ward-level data led to the need to make a number of significant qualifications, especially when interpreting the 1981 material. Therefore, it is better to design a customised methodology for each of the three censuses, such as that we applied to the grid square analysis. Our approach there may still have been too simple, and a more complex methodology could have been devised for each year, but the results still suggest substantial success in handling what is ultimately an intractable problem.

In searching for a solution, attention must be particularly focused on the census of 1991, for, at the
time of writing, it will be several years before its results are replaced by those of 2001 as a source
about the population of Belfast. Compton is of the opinion that the bulk of both the non-statement
and the claims to have no religion in 1991 were Protestant, and he has estimated population numbers
for the two groups on the assumption that there is no systematic bias caused by Catholics being more reluctant to state their religion in majority Protestant areas and vice versa (Compton, 1995). Our discussion in the previous chapter has tended to agree with this, with the exception of Belfast West. However, examination of the spatial pattern of non-response in Belfast suggests that this is not a straightforward matter, and that other factors such as social class may be in operation.

We do not actually know why some persons do not state their religion on the census return. It may
be that they feel this is not a proper area of inquiry by the Census Office, or they may not wish to
divulge their religious affiliation out of fear associated with the situation in Northern Ireland, or they may not have any meaningful place for religion in their lives. Whatever the reason, non-statement of religion
has posed a problem for the last three censuses, and this is a research issue which now needs to be addressed. We must examine available census material more deeply, including the Sample of
Anonymised Records and the Small Area Statistics, for indications as to who the non-respondents
are. Similarly, there must be a research effort aimed at discovering who, in terms of ethnic identity,
are the people who state they have no religious affiliation.

If we are to continue using religion statistics in the way in which we have done in this study, we need a clearer understanding of these issues. Moreover, ethnic monitoring has now become an integral part of public policy in Northern Ireland in response to the conflict situation (Department of Economic Development, 1989, pp 16-24), but meaningful monitoring requires reliable data to provide a benchmark for evaluation. It is highly ironic that, just as such monitoring has been embraced, the shift in the way the public answers the religion question is making the census less capable of delivering unambiguous data to establish the benchmark. Failure to solve these problems could cause serious difficulties with the analysis of future censuses and could gravely undermine the public policies dependent on such analysis.”
[End of quoted material]