RESEARCH PLAN

I. Introduction

This proposal begins with a simple question: “Why hasn’t Chicago seen sharp declines in violence like New York, Boston, or Los Angeles?” While “dual cities” (Castells and Mollenkopf 1992) appear to be general features of the global economy, what city-specific factors explain and influence variations in violence? Do cities like Chicago, with long histories of racist or religious violence, follow a different trajectory than global cities like New York or Tokyo? Might gentrification and the manner in which Chicago has carried out public policies, like the tearing down of housing projects, reinforce segregation and thus indirectly promote violence?

Some social scientists (e.g. Sampson, Raudebush, and Earls 1996) search for universal correlates of violence by using concept-s like “collective efficacy” of densely tied neighbor-hood networks. Others (e.g. Blumstein and Wallman 1999) have ana-lyzed complex factors behind the nineties “crime drop” in the US. Most criminological perspectives, however, have difficulty explain-ing variation between cities. This proposal suggests that criminology needs to engage concepts from urban political economy in order to understand differing urban trends in violence.

Chicago, like New York, Los Angeles, and other cities, has mutually reinforcing patterns of development and poverty (Sassen 1991). It is in areas of “social isolation” (Wilson 1987) or “social exclusion” (Castells 1997) where rates of violence are highest. While all cities have poor, minority, high crime areas, patterns and trends of violence differ sharply between cities.

Uniform Crime Reports show that old manufacturing centers like Detroit or St. Louis, which have not transitioned well into the information economy, also have extremely high rates of violence (>30/100,000). On the other hand, informa-tion cities like New York or Boston (< 10/100,000) have seen sharp decreases. But some cases are not so easy to explain. Chicago, for example, is an old manufactur-ing center that now has a booming information economy. Yet, social indicators like homicide (>20/100,000) and infant mortality have not declined in the same manner as in other global cities. What other factors may be at work?

We might profit by considering the comparative per-spective of Janet Abu-Lughod (1999). While she found Los Angeles and New York had bright prospects in the new economy, Chicago’s future, she thought, hinged on “whether the irreversible trend toward marginalization of poorer African Ameri-cans within the city [could] be re-versed (357)” In fact, criminologists have long associated high homicide rates with inequality and seg-regation (Bailey 1984; Taylor and Covington 1988; Lane 1997; Shihadah and Maume 1997). Following Abu-Lughod’s logic, it may be that some U.S. cities have more intractable problems with race than others.

Internationally, Chicago’s difficulties may parallel those in “contested” cities (Perry 2001), like Jerusalem and Belfast, where violence has been organically related to ethnic and religious segregation. The “invisible walls” (Clark 1964) of the ghetto, for example, could be seen as Chicago’s counterpart to the barriers between Protestants and Catholics in Belfast and between Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem.

Today's tearing down of housing projects, along with a massive expansion of what Zukin (1991) calls the "Super-Loop," has not diffused the Black ghetto, but re-concentrated it further west and further south (see charts in Abu-Lughod 1999, 336-7). Many interstitial areas, long the home to Chicago's gangs, have been invaded by professionals scouting for convenient housing near the Loop, pushing poor residents out and demanding reductions in crime.

This proposal seeks to investigate how the current re-division of space in Chicago is related to violence. It hypothesizes that some public policies and legitimate social processes contribute toward segregation, and in this way reinforce Chicago’s relatively high rates of violence.

II. Literature Review: A Proposal for the (Re-) Marriage of Urban Political Economy with Criminology

This proposal joins two estranged social science litera-tures. While criminology got its start in the ecological studies of the Chicago School, it has drifted away from the organic analysis of city life characteristic of Robert Park (Sennett 1969). The ecological tradition continues in both routine activities (Cohen and Felson 1980) and social disorgani-za-tion theory (Bursik 1988). However static concepts have gradually replaced the earlier dynamic tradition (Massey 2001). For example, even distinguished criminologists like Jim Short (1997) typically categorize cities as “big” or “small” rather than taking into account variables related to decline and revitalization.

Urban political economy, on the other hand, while originating in a critique of the Chicago School (e.g. Castells 1979; Harvey 1973), has, with few exceptions (e.g. Davis 1990; Hall 1996; Judd 1999; Caldiera 2000), paid relatively little attention to the role of crime and violence in the remaking of the postmodern city. While political economists have made extensive analyses of the workings of the global city, they too have neglected variations in trends of crime and violence between and within cities. What is needed is a closer relationship of criminology with urban political economy, and more attention to the sources of variation.

A. Criminology and the History of Urban Violence

Understanding violence requires a grasp of historical context. Hawkins (1985, 93-4) has complained that criminology has “tended to underemphasize a variety of structural, situ-ational, and institutional variables that affect interpersonal violence” as well as neglects “historical patterns developed during slavery to the immediate racialist social context of an individual homicidal offense to the operation of the criminal justice system, past and present.”

Criminology as a discipline typically reduces violence to one type, i.e. those acts which are measured in crime rates. Lane (1997, 258) however, in seeking to understand patterns of homicide, examines factors unrelated to standard criminological variables. He claims declines in homicide rates in Philadelphia in the 1920s, for example, can be explained “simply” by the decline in the Italian population. Racist Italian gangs that terrorized blacks, causing an arms race, moved to the suburbs with their ethnic group. As tensions declined, so did the number of firearms and homicides. Similarly, Lane points out that the extent and implications of southern violence against blacks were not officially measured as “crime.”

Lane looks at homicide among African Americans from a global perspective. The world-wide declines of violence in the 1950s, he suggests, might be related to expectations of people, including African Americans, of the coming benefits of modernization (see also Messner and Rosenfeld 1994). The subse-quent failure of modernity to live up to its promises, Lane (1997, 298) believes, was similarly a likely cause of the worldwide rise in rates of violence in the 1960s and 1970s. High rates of black violence in the US, according to Lane, Hawkins, and others, need to be grounded in the specific, violent experience of persisting segregation by African Americans.

One strength of the “underclass” literature is that it corrects ahistorical tendencies in criminology. Taylor and Covington (1988) in their study of neighbor-hoods and violence, dis-cussed the emergence of an underclass in Baltimore and specu-lated on the meaning of gentrification for rates of violence. Consistent with Wilson’s analysis of the impact of deindustri-alization on the Black community, Taylor and Covington found that violence is related to both gentrifying and underclass neighborhoods, but for different reasons (for Chicago, see Morenoff and Sampson 1997).

William Julius Wilson, writing with Robert Sampson (1995), explained violence by reference to the structural constraints giving rise to a ghetto-specific culture. Gangs, crime, and other anti-social behavior are seen as disorganized responses to the lack of conventional controls. The Project on Human Development in Chicago’s Neigh-borhoods (PHDCN) furthers this perspective by exploring how "individual personali-ties, family relationships, school environment, and type of community interact to contribute to delinquency and criminal behavior" (Earls 1996). The PHDCN’s key concept in explaining variation in crime and violence is "collective efficacy," a term which means the process by which neighborhoods "inhibit the occurrence of personal violence" (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997) and exercise informal social control over delinquent youth (see Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush forthcoming).
However, in the PHDCN studies, the context of Chicago sometimes seems lost in the search for universal correlates of violence. A reader of many of the articles written by scholars affiliated with the PHDCN would not know from those texts that there are massive spatial changes taking place in Chicago today — the dislocation of poor populations, the redevelopment of traditional areas of gangs and immigrants, and the physical transformation of the city.

“Collective efficacy” in Chicago also has a specific historical context, which is alien to the PHDCN’s notion of thick neighborhood networks in a healthy, inclusive community. In many white neighborhoods over the past century "collective efficacy" was positively related to violence, as whites orga-nized resis-tance to the feared black “invasion.” “Athletic Clubs,” which were officially spon-sored white gangs, were organized by politicians during World War I to act as para-military units to combat the movement of blacks into white areas. Gangs acted as the principal force in the 1919 race riots (Chicago Commission on Race Relations 1922), and played active roles in the bombings and mob violence of the next decades (Philpott 1978). Little of this violence showed up in official crime rates, consistent with Lane’s argument about racist violence in the south. Much black violence, in turn, was defensive, but more often criminalized (Perkins 1987).

Thus, if a fundamental process leading to the ghettoization of African Americans was the result of the “collective efficacy” of white neighborhoods, then scholars ought to also analyze the content of “collective efficacy” today. Some crime preven-tion strategies, which seek safety for the incoming white middle class, result in the expulsion of minority residents to other areas (see Davis 1990; 1998). Indeed, a decade ago Skogan (1990, 156-7) wrote that some kinds of neighborhood action "may also work to the positive disadvantage of the poor. Group formation succeeds more easily in better-off and white neigh-borhoods. They focus on housing, and want to freeze the current race and class distribution of desirable real estate" (emphasis in original). This proposal hypothesizes that these exclu-sive processes may have the effect of reinforcing segregation and thus indirectly increasing rates of violence (see Young 1999).

While some communities have a strategy of inclusion and community empowerment, others advocate community development through building walls, and, in Sir Peter Hall’s (1988) apt phrase “pulling up the drawbridge.” Both strategies may reduce crime rates, but measures of “collective efficacy” won’t be able to differentiate between inclusive and racist tactics. The crime prevention literature generally (e.g. Davis and Luigio 1996) focuses on stabilizing neighbor-hoods and the isolation of “undesirable” elements, but has not considered the unintended (and perhaps not always unintended) effects of such policies.

In Chicago, the processes of segregation differ sharply, however, for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. Unlike devastated African American neighborhoods such as Lawndale, Mexican communities, like Pilsen, have dense neighborhood networks along with institutionalized gangs that have become a stable part of the landscape (see also Moore 1978, 1991). Other areas, which have been off limits to African Americans, like Bridgeport and South Chicago, have welcomed large Mexican populations.

Puerto Rican neighborhoods have been pushed about Chicago over the past half century, not concentrated over time like the Black ghetto. Puerto Ricans have been dislocated from the near West Side in the 1950s by the building of the University of Illinois-Chicago, and from Lincoln Park just north of the Loop in the 1960s. Today Puerto Rican Humboldt Park is a prime target for gentrification (see Padilla 1987 for a history).
To better understand the spatial dynamics of ethnicity, segregation, and crime in Chicago, we need to turn to concepts developed by urban political economy.

B. Globalization, Crime, and Urban Political Economy

The work of Manuel Castells, Sir Peter Hall, Saskia Sassen, David Harvey, Janet Abu-Lughod and others have considered the impact of globalization on the city. Sassen (1991), who developed the concept of the “global city,” focuses on the impact of the agglomeration of business and residences in the central business zones on social organization within the city.

Sassen argues that the information era, rather than allowing work to decentralize, in fact centralizes work within downtowns of key global cities in order to maximize the creative potential of face-to-face interaction. Gentrifica-tion, then, is the “natural” tendency of people to move close to work and be with people “like themselves.” Cities like New York and Chi-cago, which offer unmatched amenities, attract the new profes-sional class to areas surrounding downtown. The professionals moving into previously poor neighborhoods build protective “walls” (Judd 1999; Caldiera 2000) around their residences, mainly as a matter of security. These “walls” can be gated communities, pacification strategies like “community policing,” or other technologies of public and private surveillance.

The new economy valorizes some spaces, but marginalizes others. Castells (1996,7,8) points out that the information era reinforces the existence of “socially excluded” areas, which are “unwired” and left out by development. These areas are marked by racial segregation, high rates of violence, and an under-ground economy that is crucial for survival (see Castells, Portes, and Benton 1989; Hagedorn and Goldstein 1999). The persistence and maintenance of Chicago’s “dark ghetto” (Clark 1964) is one concrete manifestation of social exclusion.

Three Redivisions of Space in Chicago

In Chicago, surges of violence have accompanied three great redivisions of space: 1. The formation and consolidation of the ghetto in the first half of the 20th century; 2. The making of a “second ghetto” (Hirsch 1983) in the 1950s and 1960s by building physical structures, such as high rise projects, highways, and universities as concrete barriers between the Loop and Black neighborhoods; and 3. The creation of a “Super-Loop” in the last decade, through reclaiming space previously occupied by African Americans and Latinos, and the reconstruction of the Black ghetto further south and west. All three redivisions were accompanied by a rhetoric of fear of crime and disorder.

1. In the first division of space, Chicago’s ghetto was formed as a segregated space of the industrial city. The Chicago School saw urbanization itself as linked to anomie, social disorganization, and increased rates of violence (Thomas & Znaniecki 1918; Simmel 1969, Wirth, 1938). Thrasher’s (1927) gangs were largely the children of immigrants, rebelling against their parents' old world culture and not constrained by effective social institutions (Kornhauser 1978). But the Chicago School treated the Black experience simply as an ethnic variant, a notion challenged by Drake and Cayton (1970), Spear (1983) and others (Hall 1988).

The formation of Chicago's Black ghetto was accompanied by extreme violence from whites. The race riot of 1919 was related to the competition between whites and blacks over jobs, but was basically a pogrom, lashing out at the influx of black migrants into ethnic spaces. This resulted in the forcible confinement of African Americans into a physical ghetto, sanctioned by official policy (Philpott 1978). One rationale for segregation was the prevention of crime and disorder in white ethnic neighborhoods, by keeping out the “invading” African Americans (Rakove 1975).

By the end of the 1950s, the politics of Chicago had been fundamentally shaped by public policies aimed at containing the expanding Black population, still flowing into Chicago at the end of the industrial era. Whites fled the central zones to the outlying areas and suburbs, fighting a losing guerrilla war, using both legal means (variants of restrictive covenants) and illegal means (naked violence) to contain the Black Belt. In the 1950s and 1960s, policies of resistance to integration by the Chicago Democratic machine neatly dovetailed with its plans to redevelop the Loop.

2. Chicago’s second major division of space can be seen in any picture of the massive high rises built during that time. As Mayor Richard J. Daley realized that Chicago’s future was tied to the Loop, not industry, urban redevelopment demolished low-income minority housing to expand the Loop and create more middle class neighborhoods. High rises, universities, and highways also functioned as walls between a growing African American population and the Loop and white ethnic neighborhoods. The University of Illinois-Chicago was located to protect the Loop’s western flank from eastern expansion of the west side ghetto, just as the Robert Taylor Homes and Dan Ryan Expressway attempted to stem western expansion of the south side Black Belt. In Chicago, the lack of afford-able housing and segregation became the central issues for the civil rights move-ment. But Daley’s political machine was based on a coalition of Loop interests and ethnic neighbor-hoods. His solution was to further concentrate the Black population, not to promote integration (Cohen and Taylor 2000).

The formation of what Hirsch (1983) calls a "second ghetto" didn’t bring racial peace, but only set the stage for a new round of violence in the 1960s "urban crisis era.” Gang violence and other forms of crime sharply increased in desperate and frustrated African American and Latino neighborhoods. African Americans particularly found themselves ghettoized and trapped in walled-off spaces. Gangs began to affiliate across segregated neighborhoods in the 1960s, and form "nations" which were more than tem-po-rary alliances of neighborhood cliques. The permanent state of the ghetto spawned permanent gangs. The temporary politicization of gangs in Chicago came to a violent end with massive police repression (e.g. Dawley 1992; Fry 1973; Spergel et al. 1969). Daley’s “war on gangs” (Chicago Police Dept. 1969) moved them en masse from the streets into the prisons, with disastrous future consequences. Once more, crime became the rallying cry for policies that reinforced the walls of segregation.

While repression intensified, social isolation also increased (Wilson 1987). The concentration of tens of thousands of Black people in high-rise projects that were allowed to deteriorate, was crimogenic (Venkatesh 2000), and reinforced the violence of the ghetto. As the industrial economy crumbled, joblessness and crime in poor minority neighborhoods shot up.

Harold Washington's regime above all showed how deeply engrained racial divisions were in Chicago (Simpson 2001; Clavel and Wiewel 1991). Chicago’s first Black mayor’s focus on violence reduction and conflict mediation from within the community produced modest results (Citizen’s Committee 1986). But Black political power did not last long (1983-1987) and the city’s “war on crime” resumed full-tilt. Like other cities, violence flared up in Chicago during the crack wars. But unlike New York, L.A., or Boston, a sharp reversal never materialized, as homicide stayed at levels more than twice as high as New York City’s. To understand this phenomenon, we need to understand Chicago’s third major re-division of space.

3. Like other global cities, Chicago has experienced a sus-tained economic boom over the course of the past decade which has sponsored another great redivision of space. This third redivison of space consists of several policies and spatial processes which, the proposal hypothesizes, may contribute to Chicago’s stubborn resistance to lower rates of violence.

i. The expansion of the Loop entails tearing down near-by high-rise projects and clearing space in adjacent neighborhoods. Chicag-o’s massive high rises, like Cabrini-Green on the north side, and Robert Taylor Homes just south of the Loop, have long been the scene of Chicago’s highest crime rates. While the rhetoric of crime prevention was used to justify the destruction of the projects, developers openly coveted the land.

It appears that the dispersal of housing project tenants into a new Black ghetto further west and south has displaced violence, not significantly decreased it. As Morenoff and Sampson (1997) have shown, it is in those peripheral areas where violence has been the highest. For example, Roseland, a neighborhood where African American steelworkers lived when they were excluded from South Chicago in the 1920s, has been devastated by de-industrialization. It now is one of the prime areas for migration of former CHA tenants and has high rates of violence. Lawndale on the west side, the historic home of the Vice Lords, where demographic pressure from gentrification has pushed the ghetto against the city limits, also is among the neighborhoods where homicide clusters.

ii. As the areas around the Loop gentrify, youthful residents exhibit hostility toward the arriving middle class and sometimes commit vandalism and assorted acts of class- and race-related violence. This typically leads to stepped-up security measures and harassment of minority youth. Consis-tent reports through the years have been told of slumlords hiring gangs to terror-ize residents and burn down buildings to make room for condominiums, a “complicity” in self-destruction which is a defining example of Bourdieu’s (1993) “symbolic violence.”

iii. One overlooked consequence of both gentrification and the destruction of the projects has been the displacement of gangs. Some gangs disappear when their turf is destroyed or invaded. But most gangs relocate into another neighborhood. This means that the relocated gang must make an accom-moda-tion with a new gang and area drug dealers, and often a violent contest ensues.

iv. A "geography of exclusion" (Sibley 1995) is paralleled by increases in prison population. Since the early 1970s, gangs have dominated the inmate social organization and kept strong ties to the streets (Jacobs 1977). Every major gang in Chicago is now run by leadership within the prison. As Wacquant (2000) argues, the prison and the ghetto now are linked on a single carcereal continuum. Released inmates likely concen-trate in high crime areas of Chicago’s ghetto (see Clear 1996 for New York City), though no local research on this topic exists.

Wacquant (2000) argues that the dynamics of the new economy is creating a different kind of ghetto. This new ghetto is more of a warehouse/prison than a regulator of labor, as in the past. Janet Abu-Lughod (2000), while supporting Wacquant’s central thesis, suggests that the Black experience may differ by city, and that the ghetto in Chicago may have markedly different characteristics than in New York or Los Angeles. Rather than generalize from Chicago, as Wacquant appears to do, Abu-Lughod suggests we undertake a city-specific study of the urban ghetto and the policies which maintain it.

III. Research Design

This study aims to provide quantitative and qualitative support for the hypothesis that legitimate public policies and neighborhood processes of social control can lead to segregation and thus reinforce violence. While not comparative in design, it looks at city-specific factors in Chicago to better understand the stubborn pattern of high rates of violence. Through field work and interviews, the study will describe how legitimate processes like gentrification, the displacement of gangs, the tearing down of housing projects, and the release of former inmates, may lead to violence.

The research will proceed in two stages. First the PI will supervise the compiling of quantitative data on economic and demographic trends and variations in violence in Chicago's neighborhoods and display that data graphically. Other data to be compiled include maps of gang turf from 1926 to the present, showing the movement of gang areas over time, and how gangs today have moved in re-sponse to spatial re-division. The study will also compile: Department of Correc-tions data on the addresses of parolees and probationers; infant mortality and other data stored in Chicago’s Community fact book (now administered at UIC); data on the movement of displaced Chicago Housing Authority residents; and crime rates, particularly homicide, which has address-based data (Block and Block 1991).

Gentrifying areas will be compared to socially iso-lated areas in trends of violence using standard t tests and regressions. Both raw change scores and residual change score approaches will be considered to look at change over time (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001). However, the principal objective of this phase will be to display data geographically in a series of maps (Al-Kodmany 2001). Arc-Info ™ or other GIS software will be used to construct a geographical database of the relevant data. Great Cities Scholars Kheir Al-Kodmany and James Sosnoscki will help the PI construct virtual models of segregation, gentrification, and the geographical distribution of violence and publish them on the web.

For example, changes over the entire 20th century of Chicago’s segregated areas can be virtually displayed and animated, so that a century of change could be seen unfolding in a few seconds. A graphic, web-based display of data can make the findings of the study more understandable to both the public and policymakers.
While the quantitative analysis and geo-coding is proceeding, fieldwork and interviews will target key informants from gang members to police officers to describe, from different points of view, the impact of legitimate social processes:

(1) In gentrifying areas, like sections of Humboldt Park, Pilsen, Englewood and Lawndale, the fieldwork will document incidents of hostility by area residents toward the newcomers. In Humboldt Park, area residents are currently videotaping discriminatory treatment by authorities of area youth. The study will look at community policing, block watch, and other social control measures within areas, which have high levels of “collective efficacy.” Interviews with key informants from the gangs to police will seek to understand how neighborhood social processes act to exclude or include minority youth.
(2) Using the PI’s contacts and resources from the Chicago Gang History Project, the study will document case studies of what happens to gangs as they are relocated through gentrification and destruction of housing projects.
(3) In Roseland and other areas on the south and west sides, the PI will interview residents in both licit and illicit networks and observe the impact of the relocation of housing project tenants in those neighborhoods.
(4) In Roseland, Englewood, and Lawndale, interviews and fieldwork will describe the impact of concentrations of ex-offenders on legal and illegal networks within these neighborhoods.

The interviews will be with key informants, selected in order to highlight specific processes, not on the basis of random selection. The PI has a wide assortment of contacts within each of the proposed study neighborhoods. This kind of “purposive sample” is akin to Strauss’ “theoretical sampling” (1987, 38) where the researcher decides on analytic grounds what data to collect and in what order. The intent is “verstehen” in Weber’s sense, to understand social processes as different participants see them. However the study will do more than merely report conflicting perspectives (see Fontana 1994). The PI has had a long history of collaborative analysis of data (Hagedorn 1996), and the findings and conclusions of the study will be discussed with community residents, as well as scholars at the Great Cities Institute. In this way, the research will strive to represent how participants interpret social processes and how their various interpretations can lead to real violence.

All interviews will be transcribed, coded, and analyzed using qualitative techniques used for years by the Principal Investigator (Strauss 1987; Hagedorn 1996). Interviews will be supplemented by fieldwork, as the PI becomes engaged in the observation of social processes in the study neighborhoods. The study will include documents on the history of gangs in Chicago, a study currently under way by the PI, a fellow at the Great Cities Institute. This project will also be enriched by a spring 2002 conference, “Gangs and the Global City,” orga-nized by the PI, bringing to UIC 16 leading scholars who aim to integrate urban political economy with criminology. Finally, the PI is also a participant in the four city (Chicago, Belfast, Berlin, and Jerusalem) “contested city” project that will interface with this proposed study.
To conclude, the new economy characteristically valorizes some spaces and marginalizes others. A central motif of urban political economy is that space equals power (Harvey 1990), a concept well understood by politicians and developers everywhere. This proposal, however, hypothesizes that globalization creates different kinds of spatial processes in different kinds of cities. Legitimate policies, like crime prevention, may inadvertently lead to segregation and thus undermine citywide efforts to reduce crime. This complicates Hannah Arendt’s (1969) classic contrast of violence and power, since it is the exercise of legitimate power that may lead to violence

Chicago’s current spatial re-division, it must be stressed, is not a “natural” occurrence, independent of actions by officials and residents. Policies to reduce crime are important for all inhabitants of neighborhoods, but how they are carried out matters. The re-concentration of Chicago’s African American ghetto eerily echoes ethnic and religious conflicts in Belfast and Jerusalem and may set Chicago apart from global cities like New York or Tokyo, as Janet Abu-Lughod suggested. By joining criminology with urban political economy, we might shed new light on the trends of urban violence in the information era, and what we can do about them.

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